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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Beginning as early as 2012, the Bashar Assad regime in Syria has worked to put in place
the legal and regulatory authorities to implement an ambitious vision of reconstruction
as a process of authoritarian stabilization. With its military victory close at hand, the
regime’s intent is to use reconstruction to reimpose its authority, tighten its control over
Syria’s society and economy, and fundamentally alter Syria’s demography to achieve
what Assad himself has characterized as a “healthier and more homogenous society.”
The odds that it will achieve these aims are high. Contrary to views of the Assad regime
as too severely weakened by eight years of conflict to reassert its authority, it faces
relatively few obstacles in its drive to reimpose its control. The reasons for this are rooted
in the nature of the Assad regime and in how Syria’s conflict unfolded, defying widelyheld assumptions about the effects of civil war on pre-war institutions and governance
practices, and creating a post-conflict landscape that the regime will find relatively
easy to navigate. Today, for all intents and purposes, the structure, governance, and
organization of post-conflict reconstruction in Syria are settled issues. The Assad regime
has consolidated its dominance over the levers of reconstruction, rendering it virtually
impervious to external pressure.
This assessment of Syria’s post-conflict landscape poses challenges for both
policymakers and development practitioners. To date, however, neither have addressed
its implications for policy or how Syria’s experience challenges the core assumptions
that dominate current approaches to reconstruction. This paper argues that both policy
and practice rest on problematic assumptions and calls for a fundamental rethinking of
what the options are for those hoping to shape Syria’s post-conflict trajectory.
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The disconnect between policy and practice, on the one hand, and conditions on the
ground, on the other hand, is due in no small measure to the blinkered effects of
interpreting Syria through the lens of “fragility.” Syria is regularly held out as an example
of a fragile state driven into conflict by the cumulative effects of poor governance and
dysfunctional institutions. It is more accurate, however, to describe Syria as a “fierce”
state: one in which ruling elites elevate survival above all else and design institutions
to support this aim. In fierce states, the consolidation of such institutions and their
effectiveness is often tied to attributes that directly contradict those seen as necessary
to overcome fragility, including accountability, voice, equity, transparency, and inclusion.
Instead, governance in fierce states is managed as an expression of a zero-sum existential
struggle in which conflict reinforces the determination of a ruling elite to defend existing
institutional arrangements by force. Not all fierce states survive challenges on the scale
of those confronted by the Assad regime. Those that do, however, credit their survival
to the very institutions, norms, and practices that reconstruction orthodoxy targets for
reform.
This diagnosis has obvious implications for both policy and practice. Fierce states are
poor candidates for the standard reconstruction treatment. They call into question the
value of fragility-based models of state failure as a guide for policy. Absent recognition of
the limits of fragility-based frameworks, and without acknowledging the extent to which
the Assad regime has consolidated its hold over the instruments of reconstruction, the
United States and EU may well fall into the trap of viewing Syria through the lens of
current, fragility-based reconstruction orthodoxy. Such an approach, this paper argues,
would be a mistake. It vastly underestimates the resilience of the institutions, norms, and
practices that define economic governance in Assad’s Syria. It does not take adequate
account of the near impossibility of pursuing any form of reconstruction support that
will not contribute to the regime’s project of authoritarian stabilization and demographic
change, or avoid channeling funds into the pockets of regime cronies and warlords. The
hope, however modest, that political conditions might someday permit external actors
to engage in effective, accountable reconstruction programming in Syria, or through
their interventions influence the course of reconstruction, is deeply misguided.
What both policymakers and practitioners should recognize is that the Assad regime’s
efforts to shape an architecture that ensures its unchallenged control over every aspect
of the reconstruction process are too far advanced for external actors to unravel or
easily circumvent. If the United States and EU wish to influence Syria’s post-conflict
trajectory, they will need to rely on alternatives to reconstruction as potential sources of
influence or pressure on the Assad regime.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 2018, the Syrian government issued a presidential decree regulating land use,
one of several similar laws passed since the start of the Syrian uprising in March 2011.
Under Law No. 10,1 local authorities can designate areas for redevelopment, take control
over property within these areas, and oversee their reconstruction. To receive compensation,
owners of property in designated development zones have one month to provide documents
proving their ownership.
Typically, such regulations elicit little interest. The reaction this time was different. Law No. 10
provoked a swift and sharp international response. Announced just prior to a major donors’
meeting on Syria hosted by the European Union, a senior EU official said Law No. 10 was
“the nail in the coffin” of the Assad regime’s efforts to secure reconstruction funding from
Western governments. “This is blatant power consolidation by Assad,” said the official. “It is
punitive, not regulatory. … [I]t is normal to do something like this after a natural disaster like
an earthquake. But not now. And not like this.”2 The German Foreign Ministry described Law
No. 10 as “perfidious,” a “cynical plan” designed to seize the property of refugees “to the
benefit of the regime and its supporters and hinder the return of a huge number of Syrians.”3
Prominent regime opponents criticized the law as targeting “communities once held by
rebels, from which the residents have been displaced, in order to prevent their return.”4
Critics of Law No. 10 have reason to be concerned. More than half of Syria’s pre-war
population has been displaced since 2011, and few property owners will be able to prove
their ownership in the short time provided. Many of the displaced fled from areas seen as
sympathetic to the regime’s opposition and are fearful of what awaits them should they
attempt to assert the limited rights provided to property owners under the law. Further,
regime officials have long been explicit in rejecting the return of those they view as terrorists
and traitors. In a July 2015 speech, President Assad declared that “Syria is not for those who
hold its passport or reside in it, Syria is for those who defend it.”5

RECONSTRUCTION AS AUTHORITARIAN STABILIZATION
As the Assad regime continues to roll back opposition forces and expand the areas under
its control, the pointed rebuke of Law No. 10 by EU governments is an important signal that
the regime’s military gains will not produce a rush to normalization in the West. However,
the international focus on the law’s implications for the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs), while meaningful, overlooks much deeper challenges the regime’s
reconstruction strategy poses on two fronts: for policymakers in the United States and EU,
and for practitioners of post-conflict reconstruction.
Law No. 10 focused unusual attention on the Assad regime’s use of reconstruction to
advance its political agenda. Yet the law is simply one piece of a much larger strategy for
post-conflict reconstruction that the Assad regime began to put in place as far back as 2012
with the passage of an earlier law, Decree 66, which established the initial foundations for
the regime’s wholesale seizure of land and property.6 Since then, the regime has moved
rapidly to expand the legal and regulatory authorities needed to implement an ambitious
vision of reconstruction, not merely as a way to punish its opponents or reward regime
cronies and the governments that have assured its survival, but to reimpose its authority
throughout regime-held territory, tighten its control over Syria’s economy, and fundamentally
alter Syria’s demography to achieve what Assad himself has characterized as a “healthier
and more homogenous society.”7
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Despite widespread skepticism about the regime’s capacity to undertake the enormous
effort that reconstruction will require, the odds that it will achieve its aims are high.
Contrary to views of the Assad regime as too severely weakened by eight years of
conflict to reassert its authority over areas it has retaken, or to coerce compliance from
populations that have lived beyond its reach for extended periods, the regime faces
relatively few obstacles in its drive to consolidate its position.8 The reasons for this
are rooted in how Syria’s conflict unfolded, defying widely-held assumptions about the
effects of civil war on pre-war institutions and governance practices, and creating a
post-conflict landscape that the regime will find relatively easy to navigate.
Among researchers and practitioners alike, violent conflict is assumed to disrupt prewar patterns of governance and erode or destroy pre-war political institutions. Had
these assumptions held true, the regime’s path to reconstruction would be far more
fraught. Rebuilding the basic infrastructure of governance might well have exceeded the
regime’s war-tattered capacity. Had the opposition succeeded in establishing effective
institutions in the areas it controlled, this too would have complicated regime efforts
to reassert its authority. In the Syrian case, however, these conditions are not present.
Instead, the defining feature of the Syrian conflict has been continuity in governance
practices. In the Syrian case, violent conflict did far less to disrupt pre-war norms and
practices of economic governance than is often assumed by development practitioners
and specialists on conflict economics. This continuity will significantly ease the regime’s
path as it exploits reconstruction not simply to rebuild, but to strengthen its social
and economic foundations and ensure its unchallenged control over Syria’s post-war
trajectory. It also poses distinctive challenges as policymakers and practitioners debate
whether and how to engage in Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction.
The regime’s reconstruction agenda has been evident for some time. Yet neither the
officials charged with managing U.S. and EU policy toward Syria, nor the practitioners
who design and implement reconstruction programs, have addressed its implications
for policy, or how Syria’s experience challenges the core assumptions that dominate
current approaches to reconstruction. Policy debates about the roles of the United
States and EU in rebuilding Syria are tightly linked to ideas about what reconstruction is
and how to achieve it. At present, however, both policy and practice rest on problematic
assumptions. As was evident at the April 2018 donors’ conference in Brussels, policy
debates are proceeding as if the options for Syria’s reconstruction remain largely
unchanged from what they were in 2015, after large-scale Russian intervention set the
conflict on its current path to a regime military victory.9 At the same time, practitioners
of reconstruction are proceeding as if Syria can be made to fit within a standard
reconstruction template framed in terms of overcoming state fragility—the principal
construct through which the causes of conflict and the measures needed to mitigate its
effects are defined. Neither is true, and the apparent difficulty among both policymakers
and practitioners in bridging the gap between the models of reconstruction that inform
policy debates, on the one hand, and conditions on the ground in Syria, on the other
hand, is troubling.
What this gap between assumptions and conditions highlights is the need for a more
fundamental rethinking of what the options are in seeking to shape Syria’s post-conflict
trajectory. Absent recognition of the limits of fragility-based frameworks as models for
policy, and without adequate recognition of the extent to which the Assad regime views
reconstruction as a project of authoritarian stabilization—the pathway through which it
intends to reassert its authority and renew the governance arrangements on which its
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survival depends—the United States and the EU may well fall into the trap of viewing
Syria through the lens of current reconstruction orthodoxy, as posing challenges that
can be addressed through the standard reconstruction treatment intended to mitigate
drivers of fragility. Such an approach would be a mistake. It vastly underestimates the
resilience of the institutions, norms, and practices that define economic governance in
Assad’s Syria. It does not take adequate account of the near impossibility of pursuing
any form of reconstruction support that will not contribute to the regime’s project of
authoritarian stabilization and demographic change, or avoid channeling funds into the
pockets of regime cronies and warlords.

FIERCE STATES AND THE LIMITS OF FRAGILITY
This disconnect is due in no small measure to the blinkered effects of seeing the world
through a fragility lens. Syria is regularly held out as an example of a fragile state
driven into conflict by the cumulative effects of poor governance and dysfunctional
institutions.10 Yet it is more accurate to describe Syria as a fierce state: one in which
ruling elites elevate survival above all else and design institutions to support this aim. In
fierce states, the consolidation of such institutions, and the effectiveness with which they
contribute to regime survival, is often correlated with attributes that directly contradict
those associated with good governance or resilience, including accountability, voice,
equity, transparency, and inclusion.11 Instead, governance in fierce states is managed
as an expression of a zero-sum existential struggle in which conflict reinforces the
determination of a ruling elite to defend existing institutional arrangements by force.
This does not imply that fierce states are indifferent to development as it is conventionally
understood. Regimes in fierce states, including in Syria, understand the threat that
disaffected populations can pose. They understand the benefit of strengthening the
dependence of citizens on regimes through the use of redistributive social policies.12
They are sensitive to the value of popular legitimacy, despite their reliance on repression
and the use of violence. For instance, in his January 2011 interview with The Wall Street
Journal, Bashar Assad appealed, naively, it turned out, to the legitimacy he believed his
regime enjoyed as a result of its resistance to Israel and the United States to assert that
Syria would never fall victim to the protests then sweeping the region.13
Moreover, fierce states have constituencies—“stakeholders,” in current development
jargon. They rest on a social base. They construct alliances and coalitions, typically on
the basis of transactional loyalty. They structure incentives to reward compliance. And
when challenged by insurgencies or civil war, fierce states may prove more resilient than
fragility-based models of state weakness and vulnerability tend to assume. Not all fierce
states survive challenges on the scale of those confronted by the Assad regime. Those
that do, however, credit their survival to the very institutions, norms, and practices
that reconstruction orthodoxy targets for reform. It is, perhaps, not so surprising that
dictators who prevail in civil wars tend to have exceptionally long tenures in office. Of the
25 longest-serving rulers in the world today, 13 survived civil wars or rose to power after
prevailing in civil war, and preside over regimes that are either dictatorships or illiberal
democracies.14
This diagnosis has obvious implications for current debates about post-conflict
reconstruction in Syria. The hope, however modest, that political conditions might
someday permit external actors to engage in effective, accountable reconstruction
programming in Syria, or through their interventions influence the course of
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reconstruction, is deeply misguided.15 Similarly, the argument that the United States
and the EU must support reconstruction to avoid creating a black hole in Syria that
will drive radicals and refugees into Europe is a bit of protection racket diplomacy that
should be resisted.16
What both policymakers and practitioners should recognize is that the Assad regime’s
efforts to shape an architecture that ensures its unchallenged control over every aspect
of the reconstruction process are too far advanced for external actors to unravel or easily
circumvent. In the past five years, and with increasing scope and speed since 2015, the
Assad regime has created a dense web of mechanisms, networks, and linkages that
includes senior regime officials, the state bureaucracy, legislative mechanisms at the
national and local levels, the regime-controlled NGO sector, business cronies, warlords,
and opportunistic loyalists. The result is a reconstruction apparatus that is flexible,
adaptive, resilient, and virtually impervious to external pressure. For all intents and
purposes, the structure, governance, and organization of post-conflict reconstruction
in Syria are settled issues. The most important lessons that policymakers and
practitioners can draw from Syria’s experience, therefore, are an understanding of the
limits of fragility-based models of post-conflict reconstruction, and the need to address
the challenges that fierce states pose to current reconstruction orthodoxy.

BEYOND RECONSTRUCTION ORTHODOXY
Typically defined as an effect of dysfunctional institutions that produce negative social,
political, and economic outcomes, state fragility is widely recognized as a leading cause
of violent conflict.17 A large and growing body of evidence indicates that fragile states
are especially vulnerable to internal strains that weak and flawed institutions cannot
manage or mitigate.18 As the incidence of civil wars increased from the early 2000s
onward, spiking sharply in the mid-2010s, efforts to design post-conflict interventions
that address the institutional and social causes of state fragility have become a leading
priority of governments, development agencies, and international financial institutions.19
Over the past decade, these efforts have converged around a relatively narrow range
of understandings—a reconstruction orthodoxy that has achieved wide currency among
development practitioners—about the purposes and aims of post-conflict reconstruction
and how best to rebuild war-torn societies to address the conditions that caused conflict
in the first place. Opportunities to address the drivers of violent conflict are linked to the
effects of conflict on dysfunctional pre-war institutions. These “fragile” institutions are
seen as causes of violent conflict. In turn, violent conflict is assumed to bring about their
breakdown, creating possibilities for more effective, inclusive, and accountable postconflict governance frameworks, typically defined in terms of inclusive social contracts
or political settlements, to emerge.20 In addition, the devastating effects of conflict are
assumed to empower constituencies with an interest in reform, increasing the prospects
that post-conflict reconstruction will find willing local partners.
Thus, the aim of post-conflict reconstruction is not to return war-torn societies and
states to their pre-war condition, but to make use of the space that violent conflict is
presumed to create to put in place institutions, norms, and practices that address the
causes of violence and provide a basis for effective governance and sustainable peace.
This includes transforming frameworks of economic governance so that conditions of
economic “normalcy” can be established—conditions that differ from those that emerge
during conflict, when pre-war economic norms and practices are presumed to break
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down under the strain of violence. In this view, reconstruction succeeds by “transforming
post-conflict countries into functioning states that can offer their citizens basic public
services.”21 Wartime economies are thus viewed as abnormal; we know reconstruction
is working when “the main features of an economy no longer stem from the war but from
the normal conditions of the economy.”22
No one imagines that these transformations are fast or easy. There is wide recognition
among policymakers, scholars, and practitioners of the enormous variation that exists
among countries exiting conflict, and of the daunting challenges that overcoming fragility
confronts, especially in post-conflict settings.23 There is little naiveté among specialists
about the many ways in which post-conflict reconstruction can go wrong. Nonetheless,
the underlying assumption that successful reconstruction requires the transformation of
pre-war systems of governance, political economies, and social norms remains central
to reconstruction orthodoxy and continues to guide policy and practitioner debates
about Syria. This view is elaborated in a clear causal chain anchored in four principal
assumptions:
1. violent conflict is largely a product of state fragility;
2. violent conflict weakens or destroys dysfunctional pre-war institutions;
3. the destruction of pre-war institutions opens up space for post-conflict
reconstruction to transform war-torn societies, reform institutions, and overcome
the conditions that might reproduce fragility and lead to a recurrence of violence;
and
4. because violent conflict is so profoundly destructive, it creates or empowers local
actors who form constituencies favoring transformational reforms.
There may well be cases in which these assumptions hold. As the following sections
illustrate, however, Syria’s experience of violent conflict carries important lessons about
the limits of this reconstruction orthodoxy.

CONTINUITY AND WARTIME ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE24
In keeping with assumptions about the destructive effects of violent conflict on pre-war
institutions, conflict economies are often treated as a distinctive species, zones where
“normal” economic practices are suspended and violence-centered economies with
“features unique to civil war” take hold.25 In contrast to pre-war political economies,
wartime political and economic orders are viewed as idiosyncratic in the extent to which
they lack rule of law, accountability, and transparency.
Syria’s experience, however, challenges these assumptions. Violent conflict has been
marked by a high degree of continuity in the corrupt, predatory, and coercive norms and
practices that were pervasive in Syria’s pre-war political economy. Prior to the onset of
conflict in 2011, the political requirements of regime survival trumped concerns about
economic and social development.26 State elites engaged routinely in illicit practices to
enrich themselves at public expense. Criminal economic networks were tightly integrated
into, and operated as prominent features of, state-regime-business relations among
both civilian elites and the Syrian military, which itself was a powerful economic actor.27
Loyalty and legitimacy were established and sustained through transactional bargains
negotiated between the regime and networks of local actors. Informal institutions—
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including patron-client networks—were more influential than formal institutions or
policy processes in shaping economic and political outcomes. These features continue
to define Syria’s wartime political economy from 2011 onward. In many important
respects, violent conflict was not just an ideal setting for the reproduction of pre-war
norms and practices, it provided the impetus to deepen and expand the predatory, illicit,
and corrupt economic logics that organized economic activity before 2011.
To be clear, asserting continuity in economic norms and practices after 2011 does not
imply that nothing has changed. Civil war has been accompanied by the destruction
of physical and social infrastructure on a massive scale.28 The organization of Syria’s
political economy has been profoundly reconfigured by years of violent conflict.29 Prewar economic networks have been disrupted and new, conflict-based networks have
taken their place.30 Violence fractured Syria’s national economy and contributed to the
emergence of highly localized zones of economic activity, often dominated by warlords
who enjoyed significant autonomy from the regime.31 Yet war did not create a blank slate
on which new norms and practices of economic governance might take root. Rather,
pre-war norms and practices were reproduced and deepened as violence escalated.
Across the country, economic fragmentation went hand-in-hand with the diffusion and
deepening of economic norms and practices that were commonplace in pre-war Syria. In
opposition-held areas, for example, where the regime had previously exerted significant
influence over how local markets were organized through both formal regulation and
informal networks of patronage and clientelism, the armed groups that controlled
various “free areas” were often corrupt, predatory, and exploitative, but cared little
about regulation of local markets, how local economic activities were organized, and
who could enter the market to engage in specific economic activities—all aspects of
economic governance the Assad regime controlled more tightly.32
With few exceptions, armed opposition groups devoted little attention to economic
governance beyond assuring that their own economic requirements were met,33 often by
engaging in the same economic behaviors characteristic of the Assad regime.34 In some
instances, battalion commanders preferred to outsource mundane aspects of economic
governance to civilian counterparts in local councils and civil society organizations to
avoid navigating fraught and complex matters among civilian populations, like the
distribution of humanitarian assistance or the adjudication of economic disputes.35 The
result was the rapid emergence of virtually unregulated markets, essentially economic
free zones, especially in the areas adjacent to the Turkish border and in Syria’s southwest
province of Daraa. In these areas, opposition warlords became influential economic
actors, enriching themselves and their organizations through tactics similar to those
used by regime figures.36 Criminal and informal economic activity thrived through highly
personalized networks that regularly extended across conflict lines into regime-held
areas, and operated on the basis of transactional ties that linked adversaries in the
pursuit of profit.
The strategies used by traders in opposition-held areas to navigate “checkpoint
economies” are a vivid example of how the persistence of pre-war economic practices
sustained wartime economic activity and preserved network connections across conflict
lines.37 In both regime- and opposition-held areas, militias established competing clusters
of roadblocks along key routes, forcing traders to pay bribes for the safe movement of
goods through each one. For merchants based in opposition areas who routinely moved
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products back and forth across conflict lines, the levels at which these “taxes” were fixed
meant the difference between profit and loss. When opposition checkpoints became too
predatory, these merchants would sometimes take measures to avoid them. Instead of
moving goods from Turkey overland into Syria through areas controlled entirely by the
opposition and subject to predatory taxes, they would have them shipped from the port
of Mersin in southern Turkey to regime-held Latakia, where they would pay local, regimeaffiliated brokers a fee to move the goods through regime areas and across conflict lines
until they reached their final destination in opposition-held parts of the country. Trusted
brokers in opposition areas with ties to counterparts in Latakia might assist in facilitating
these transactions. According to one Syrian trader, their capacity to select the least
costly means of transport, and to divert goods around predatory checkpoints, helped
keep checkpoint taxes under control; when the volume of trade went down, checkpoint
commanders would lower the fees they extracted from traders. Traders and militias thus
engaged in a strategic game, with each looking to maximize returns, and with militias
sensitive to the tipping point beyond which predatory behavior would reduce checkpoint
revenue.
These features of wartime economic orders in opposition areas had their counterparts in
regime-held territory. Similar elements of fragmentation, the absence of central authority,
and the consolidation of increasingly autonomous economic networks were present
in areas nominally held by the regime but governed, in fact, by local militias led by de
facto warlords. In these areas, as well, formal economic activity ground to a halt, yet the
coercive and predatory economic norms and practices that defined the regime’s preuprising approach to economic governance proved to be well-suited for the purpose of
extracting resources from civilian populations in the midst of conflict. Predation, coercion,
and corruption, it turns out, are scalable, dispersed, and can function effectively both
through more tightly-coupled predatory networks—such as those dominated by the inner
circles of the Assad regime before the war—and through the more fragmented, looselycoupled, and dispersed networks that developed in regime-held areas as the civil war
ground on.
On the regime side, in parallel with practices that were commonplace among opposition
groups, predatory activities included protection rackets in which businessmen were
compelled to contribute to the war effort to remain in good standing with the regime,
as well as other explicitly criminal forms of resource extraction.38 Kidnapping for ransom
(where kidnappers often demanded that families of victims sign over property deeds), was
widespread in regime territories, with criminal networks linked to regime officials, loyalist
militias, and armed opposition groups regularly implicated in such acts.39 Over time,
the informal economic networks that the Assad regime had used for years—extending
opportunities for private profit through tolerated illicit activities in exchange for loyalty
and service as regime enforcers (i.e., localized Shabiha networks)—not only endured, but
emerged as central to the dispersed strategy of predatory, coercive extraction that grew
stronger as the Syrian state and regime weakened. As one analyst noted in 2016:
“As the once totalitarian Syrian central state atrophies, its constituent parts—be
they sectarian, rentierist, or simple brutes—have gained a stunning degree of
political and economic independence from Damascus. Contrary to what others
have claimed, Assad’s regime has not struck some grand bargain with a large
section of Syria’s urban Sunni population. Instead, he has elevated to power the
most brutish elements of the country and doubled down on the sectarian, tribal,
and thuggish inclinations of its base.”40
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What the civil war produced, therefore, across regime- and opposition-held areas,
were parallel political economies in which pre-war norms and practices of economic
governance prevailed. They were constituted by highly localized and fragmented wartime
economic spaces, knit together by personalized and transactional networks that
extended across both conflict lines and state borders. Violent conflict certainly affected
these networks. It changed their composition, opened the door for new economic actors
to emerge, and shifted virtually all economic activity from formal to informal sectors.
Conflict has expanded the scope and scale of predatory activities. It reinforced the
perception of the conflict among regime loyalists as an extraordinary opportunity to
accumulate wealth, contributing to rampant criminality in regime-held and recaptured
areas.41
This apparent fragmentation of the state and the emergence of powerful local economic
networks are widely described as threatening the post-conflict reconstruction of
both the Assad regime and the Syrian state.42 In the view of many policymakers and
practitioners, the regime has won, at best, a pyrrhic victory. Eight years of relentless
military operations have exhausted its political, institutional, military, and financial
capacities, rendering it incapable of reasserting its authority. It cannot independently
sustain or expand the military gains of the past three years, which were achieved almost
entirely through the support of Russia and Iran.43 It cannot control the many proxy
forces that are exploiting the Syrian conflict to advance their own interests, including by
establishing militias independent of the Assad regime.44 Nor can it independently fund
reconstruction or anticipate a quick return to business as usual; there is no end in sight
for the extensive sanctions regime that effectively cut Syria off from global markets.
In other words, having sacrificed its sovereignty in the interest of survival, Assad now
oversees a Potemkin regime, not a state or government capable of directing Syria’s
post-conflict trajectory.
These claims, however, should not be exaggerated.45 The regime has acted to reign
in and otherwise discipline unruly loyalist fighters, at times with Russian assistance.46
Targets of the regime have included the most prominent and presumably most influential
warlord-cronies of the Assad family.47 Indeed, a recent assessment of the capacity of
the regime to control and manage loyalist warlords concluded that Assad continues to
hold the upper hand:
“To be sure, the fact that the regime had to turn to—and in some cases create—
militias to shore up its fighting and policing capabilities was a sign of weakness.
That, combined with incidents of unauthorized violence by these loyalist militias,
has been taken as a harbinger of the regime’s imminent demise. … But this
reasoning belies the resilience of Assad’s Ba’athist regime, which has proven
willing to deploy any tool and make a multitude of devil’s bargains to ensure its
survival. While Assad has undoubtedly sacrificed a degree of his authority to
loyalist militias, these groups’ autonomy to operate still depends on the regime’s
permission.”48
Further, reasserting the regime’s authority does not imply that empowered local elites
will be forced to rein in their behavior.49 Because local actors use the same economic
tactics as the regime, accommodating the restoration of its authority will not necessarily
require that they end the practices through which they enriched themselves when the
regime was absent. Loyalists are far more likely to see the benefit of exploiting the
regime’s return to strike deals and establish bargains with Damascus, preserve their
10 | Foreign Policy at Brookings
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access to predatory opportunities, use mechanisms like Law No. 10 to give legal status
to the assets they accumulated during wartime, and validate their standing as local
power brokers who act on the regime’s behalf. Reconstruction, in this view, offers a
promising opportunity to put looted wealth to new uses, to launder it and legalize it
through participation in regime-sanctioned reconstruction projects.

RECONSTRUCTING AUTHORITARIANISM IN POST-CONFLICT SYRIA
Since September 2015, the Assad regime has retaken large swaths of territory and
consolidated its control over the vast majority of what the French termed “La Syrie utile,”
useful Syria—the western spine of the country encompassing all of its major urban
centers. As the regime has gained ground, it has also worked to advance a process of
post-conflict reconstruction, not simply of the war-ravaged economy, but of the regime’s
sovereignty and authority over all of the territory under its control.
For the regime, these two elements of reconstruction are inextricably linked: economic
reconstruction is first and foremost an instrument for the reassertion of the regime’s
authority and sovereignty. The extent to which economic reconstruction will serve this
end is the principal criterion guiding the politics and political economy of post-conflict
reconstruction. Thus far, the regime’s strategy has been largely successful. With Russian
support, the regime has successfully fended off Western attempts to link reconstruction
funds to progress on a meaningful political transition. It has moved to prevent external
funds from entering areas under its control through non-regime managed channels. It
has also imposed broad legal restrictions regulating the in-country operations of the
U.N. and international NGOs, affirming that only the Assad regime, as Syria’s sovereign
authority, is empowered to oversee reconstruction programs.50
Thus, while the regime will eagerly accept any reconstruction assistance it can control—
the critical payoff from donor assistance is not only dollars but the international
legitimacy it brings—it is less concerned than is often assumed about the impact that a
lack of donor contributions will have on the pace of reform. Indeed, the regime seems
to view funding that might compromise its control as a greater risk to its stability than
a slower, more limited process funded at lower levels, but conducted completely under
the regime’s supervision and authority—and organized to maximize the political gains it
delivers for the regime.
In keeping with this sense of reconstruction as a jealously guarded preserve of the
regime, it has vowed to offer reconstruction contracts only to governments that
supported it during the civil war; Russia, Iran, and China are the major beneficiaries
of regime contracts to date.51 It has established regulatory and legal frameworks that
privilege leading economic actors linked to the regime, expanded the authority of public
sector agencies to invest in “public-private partnerships,” and consolidated the regime’s
control over all reconstruction-related activities.52
These legal and regulatory frameworks provide the regime with the tools to reward
supporters and punish opponents—among whom it includes not just active supporters
of the opposition, but large segments of Syria’s pre-2011 population that happened
to reside in areas that fell under opposition control—and to engage in demographic
engineering to prevent the return of refugees and those forcibly displaced within Syria
as a result of “starve or surrender” sieges.53 The regime has also exploited existing
and new property rights laws to seize land and housing on a massive scale.54 It has
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expropriated neighborhoods of Damascus, Homs, and Hama that were known as proopposition areas and largely destroyed during the war.55 It is also expropriating property
of displaced persons it suspects as having supported the opposition. Properties seized
are being offered to regime cronies (and, allegedly, to Iranian citizens) for redevelopment
projects, some of which are being characterized as rivalling in scale Beirut’s notorious
Solidaire project, through which Rafik Hariri bulldozed Beirut’s war-torn downtown and
rebuilt it as an idealized example of a modern-traditional Arab city, but focused on highend luxury retail. These efforts are designed not only to reward cronies and rebuild
damaged infrastructure, but to advance the regime’s program of demographic change,
and insulate reconstruction from any attempts by powers the regime views as hostile to
influence the implementation of reconstruction programs.56
There is ample evidence of the extent to which select business cronies of the regime are
benefitting from these mechanisms, including the growing body of laws and regulations
that have awarded them confiscated property at no cost, permitted them to purchase
land seized by the state at below-market prices, and given them access to funds
provided by the state bank on preferential terms.57 The transformation of Basateen alRazi—an opposition stronghold only 5 miles from downtown Damascus—into “Marouta
City” is perhaps the most vivid example of this trend. Its redevelopment is being led
by a consortium of pro-regime businessmen through a coalition of holding companies
that includes Rami Makhlouf, Bashar Assad’s maternal cousin and the country’s most
prominent (and wealthiest) regime crony.58 Indeed, Makhlouf is poised to become the
lead beneficiary of a wide range of reconstruction activities.59 Other “peak cronies”
associated with the Marouta City project include Khaled al-Zubaidi and Nader Qalei, two
businessmen closely linked to the Assad regime; Mazen Tarazi, a relatively unknown
Kuwait-based businessman with strong regime ties; Bishr al-Sabban, the governor of
Damascus and chairman of the board of Damascus Cham Private Joint Stock Company;
and Samer Foz, the CEO of the Aman Group.60 Little known before 2011, Foz emerged
during the war to become one Syria’s most influential and powerful businessmen, “to
the extent he is now dubbed the ‘new Rami Makhlouf.’”61
A similar coalition of wartime business cronies is poised to develop additional zones
in formerly opposition-held neighborhoods of east Damascus, including Mezzeh, Kafr
Soussah, Qadam, and Darayya, a huge area totaling some 2200 acres and reportedly to
be renamed Basila City, or “Peace City” in old Aramaic. Reconstruction activities in other
urban centers including Homs and Hama have also become targets of regime cronies
and senior regime figures who exploit their ties to the regime for personal gain.62 While
these high-profile figures monopolize the most visible and large-scale reconstruction
efforts, their activities are matched at a smaller scale by less prominent regime-linked
businessmen and lower-level officials throughout regime-held areas, including individuals
such as Republican Guard officer and a founder of the National Defense Force (NDF),
Bassam al-Hasan; his nephew, Saqr Rustom, who led NDF operations in Homs; and
Hussam Qaterji, the regime’s broker to ISIS and, more recently, the Kurdish Democratic
Union Party (PYD). Collectively, the emergence of these new cohorts of loyalist business
elites not only serve to renew and consolidate the regime’s authority, they provide the
regime with business partners who have thus far evaded U.S. or EU sanctions, opening
up new channels for trade and investment that can assist the regime in getting around
restrictions that constrain better known regime cronies.
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In addition, reconstruction serves as a potent instrument for the reassertion of the
regime’s authority and the reimposition of regime control over formerly autonomous
warlords and wartime profiteers. Laws passed by the regime since 2015 expanding
the scope of economic authority vested in local officials are a key indicator of how
reconstruction is being used to strike new forms of accommodation between militialinked wartime profiteers and the regime in Damascus. These include Law No. 5 of
2016, which empowers local officials to enter “public-private partnerships,” and Decree
19 of 2015, authorizing private holding companies to “take over the management of
assets and properties owned by cities and towns across the country.”63 According to a
credible source,
“the latest decree appears to have … serious implications, potentially privatizing
all the services provided to the population at a local level and enabling the
management of public property by private investors. Given the absence of
safeguards, the lack of independence of the Syrian judicial system, the absence
of any form of organised civil society, the consequences of the decree are
potentially very dangerous with regards to the ownership by Syrians of public
goods.”64
Together with the more recent Law No. 10, these earlier measures create the legal
pretext for the transfer of private property into the hands of regime loyalists on an
unprecedented scale. As local authorities and municipalities act over the coming
years to create agencies charged with designating development zones, and then seize
property within these zones, these laws make it possible to transfer ownership of
property to private holding companies that operate with very little scrutiny or oversight.
There is evidence, moreover, that local warlords are already beginning to recognize the
opportunity such provisions offer, and create corporate entities that will permit them to
launder the assets they acquired during the war, make new investments in real estate,
and engage in the redevelopment of areas destroyed in war, including areas in which
displaced residents were viewed as sympathetic to the opposition.
A large number of such entities have been established in Syria in the past year.65
According to The Syria Report, these include Damas Real Estate Development and
Investment LLC, established by Bassam al-Hasan and his nephew, Saqr Rustom; Qaterji
Real Estate Development and Investment, formed by Baraa Qaterji and his brothers (this
group established other companies in different business sectors as well); and Wassim
Qattan, another previously unknown businessman who has recently emerged from
“outside the formal trade networks” to become a major player in Damascus real estate
markets, and recently formed a number of companies to exploit post-war business
opportunities.
These examples highlight the mechanisms through which the Assad regime is exploiting
its legislative authority to create incentives for local warlords and wartime profiteers to
re-integrate into the regime’s economic networks and contribute to the reconsolidation
of its authority in post-conflict Syria. They also show the effectiveness with which the
regime is exploiting state-based instruments and institutions to reproduce pre-war
economic norms and practices, including its ability to create relationships of economic
dependence with business actors that rely on the regime to secure and give legal cover
for predatory modes of wealth accumulation. Among other things, these arrangements
raise doubts about claims that the fragmentation of Syria’s economy during conflict, and
the emergence of local warlords who operated autonomously from the regime, would
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constitute a significant obstacle to its ability to assert itself once conflict ends. The
evidence to date suggests that the regime is not finding it difficult to rebuild transactional
ties of mutual advantage with wartime profiteers and warlords.
Relations between the regime and other segments of business elites follow a similar
pattern: pre-war norms and practices continue to define the dynamics of regime-business
ties after 2011. Conflict altered the composition of pre-war economic networks. It opened
up new opportunities for profit, even as much of the country’s economic infrastructure
was destroyed. Yet the regime’s longstanding practice of co-opting leading businessmen
and cultivating their dependence on the regime persisted and has served it well, helping
it to mitigate the impact of economic sanctions, strengthening its ability to manage the
economic demands of protracted conflict, and providing it with ready partners as it turns
its attention to post-conflict reconstruction.66
For their opposition counterparts, militia commanders, traders, and businessmen
who constructed local economic orders anchored in the same corrupt, illicit, predatory
norms and practices as their adversaries, opportunities to exploit reconstruction will be
more limited. Yet precisely because their wartime economic activities thrived by making
use of contacts and networks within the regime—for example, to smooth the passage
of goods across conflict lines—they too are likely to find that post-conflict conditions
create possibilities for them to transform wartime business activities into post-conflict
opportunities, as long as they are willing to proclaim their loyalty to the regime. This
pragmatism was an important condition of wartime economic survival in oppositionheld areas. There are few reasons to expect that public affirmation of loyalty to the
regime, and willingness to pay the price for continuing to do business under the regime’s
control, will prove to be significant obstacles to the reconstruction of regime authority in
areas of the country formerly held by the opposition—especially when those least likely
to bend the knee have been killed, detained, or forced to flee, forfeiting their property
in the process.
In addition, the regime has been adept in cultivating economic ties across conflict
lines that are generating crucial financial resources and giving it the means to rebuild
infrastructure that is essential to support its reconstruction agenda. For example, the
oil the regime used to buy from ISIS it now purchases from the PYD, using revenue
sharing arrangements reportedly valued at about $8 per barrel. These transactions are
brokered by the same highly-placed business cronies, such as Hussam al-Qatarji, who
once brokered trade with the Islamic State.67 According to informed sources, between
50,000-70,000 barrels per day are being moved by tanker trucks into regime-held areas.
This traffic is not only a major source of revenue, it enables the regime to improve basic
services that are important in stabilizing areas under its control: electricity production
has increased significantly in Syria in the past year, to the point that Syria is now
reported to be selling electricity to Lebanon.68 Not least, such revenues strengthen the
bargaining position of the regime in its rejection of Western conditions on the provision
of reconstruction assistance.
In sum, the economic legacies of a corrupt, authoritarian, predatory, and coercive
regime were evident in how wartime economic orders came to be constructed in the
period from 2011 to the present, whether in regime-held or in opposition-held areas
of Syria. This continuity in economic norms and practices has shaped a post-conflict
landscape conducive to a regime-controlled process of reconstruction even in areas
long held by opposition forces. It represents a significant obstacle to the efforts of U.S.
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and EU governments to affect Syria’s post-conflict trajectory. Continuity places the Assad
regime on familiar ground as it seeks to reconsolidate its control, and it has proven itself
to be adept in exploiting this familiarity in areas it has retaken from the opposition.

THE RESILIENCE OF FRAGILITY: RETHINKING RECONSTRUCTION IN
FIERCE STATES
Syria’s recent experience carries important lessons for current reconstruction orthodoxy.
Syria’s conflict can certainly be attributed to poor governance and its attendant effects:
corruption, predatory norms and practices, and dysfunctional institutions. Yet the
experience of the Assad regime as it transitions from conflict to an unstable “authoritarian
peace” underscores the need to reconsider just how fragile the institutions and practices
are that generate outcomes typically associated with fragility.69 Syria should be seen
not as a fragile state subject to the standard post-conflict treatment, but as a fierce
state, one in which the institutional arrangements associated with state weakness
are not the failed outcomes of state-building processes that sought, but fell short of
achieving inclusive, participatory, developmentally effective forms of governance.
Rather, since the 1960s, state building in Syria has reflected the intentional, strategic
choices of authoritarian elites who designed governance institutions to implement their
exclusionary, repressive, and predatory preferences.
The institutions that resulted from this process of state building did not lack capacity, nor
were they fragile. They have provided Syria’s ruling elite with the organizational means to
construct durable, repressive-exclusionary systems of rule; appropriate resources and
redistribute them through mechanisms that privileged regime loyalists; and consolidate
a social pact between the regime and select categories of citizens. And as the Assad
regime has shown, it is willing to impose an agonizingly high price on Syrians to defend
these institutions. The Syrian conflict, therefore, may well be an indicator of regime
dysfunction and the limits of the economic and political institutions on which it rests. Yet
the regime’s capacity to survive a large-scale armed insurgency with Iranian and Russian
support, its ability to sustain a level of state function throughout the conflict even in
opposition-held areas, and the determination it has shown in designing a reconstruction
process intended to reinforce existing institutions, norms, and practices make clear that
conflict and indicators of fragility are not perceived by the regime as signals of the need
for transformational reform.70
In the Syrian case, conflict has reinforced rather than weakened pre-war modes of
economic governance. It has not opened space for reform. It has not empowered local
constituencies that support reform. Nowhere is this clearer than in how the Assad regime
has designed the legal architecture of reconstruction to give itself complete control
over every aspect of the process, and in its uses of reconstruction as the means for
consolidating its authority, enriching networks of business cronies, and implementing
its vision of a “more homogenous and healthier” Syrian society.71
Moreover, Syria’s experience is not unique. Continuity of pre-war economic norms and
practices in the midst of violent conflict, with all that continuity implies about how postconflict reconstruction is likely to unfold, is also evident in Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and
other cases of violent civil war.72 Collectively, these cases pose significant challenges
to fragility-based models of post-conflict reconstruction. They call into question the
core assumptions that guide current reconstruction orthodoxy about the plausibility of
imagining reconstruction as an opportunity to reform or rebuild institutions to address
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underlying causes of state fragility. They underestimate the resilience of institutions,
norms, and practices associated with fragility even when they increase the likelihood
of violent conflict. Conditions associated with fragility have often very influential
constituencies. They create powerful incentives that shape the strategic choices of local
actors, giving fragility a degree of path-dependence that many practitioners have been
slow to acknowledge. They are anchored in understandings about the purposes of the
state and of governance that are sharply at odds with those viewed by many development
practitioners as essential elements of good governance, including accountability, voice,
transparency, equality, and inclusiveness. To borrow a well-worn cliché, the institutions,
norms, and practices associated with fragility are not bugs, they are features. Conflict
is an environment in which these features thrive, and post-conflict is seen by those who
prevail in conflict as an opportunity to strengthen and expand them, not to subject them
to processes of institutional reform or redesign.
For practitioners of reconstruction, these lessons from the Syrian case may be deeply
troubling. They raise questions about the fundamental utility of fragility as a concept,
and its value as a model in the design of post-conflict reconstruction programs. Yet
these lessons also open up possibilities for rethinking approaches to reconstruction, for
defining more clearly the conditions under which rebuilding war-torn societies will create
outcomes that leave societies better off, better governed, and more secure, given the
incentives that reinforce inequality, corruption, predation, and exclusion. Syrians, as
well as Yemenis, Libyans, and others from societies devastated by conflict, would be well
served by such an exercise.
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